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Abstract
This research examines citizen acceptance of tolls and road pricing, and specifically focuses on
determinants of the individual’s expressed willingness-to-pay tolls to use a tunnel express lane
that would be free of traffic delays. We answer the research question “What factors influence
citizens’ willingness-to-pay tolls” by empirically estimating a four factor model of willingnessto-pay: (a) direct benefit to the respondent; (b) relative cost over time; (c) community concern;
and (d) political and environmental liberalism. We use data about citizen perceptions from the
Life in Hampton Roads Survey, a survey of residents of Hampton Roads, Virginia. We find that
willingness-to-pay is primarily driven and motivated by self-interest, through a balancing of
benefit to cost relative to individual income and frequency of use. . In addition, concern for the
community also contributes to willingness-to-pay tolls. The individual’s perception of
government’s trustworthiness, a reflection of political and environmental beliefs, also influences
the extent to which an individual is willing to pay tolls. Keywords: Willingness-to-pay, tolls,
road pricing, tunnel congestion
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1. Introduction
For most urban areas in the U.S., traffic congestion and subsequent travel delays have
become significant problems. For example, statistics from the Texas Transportation Institute
indicate that congestion, measured as delay per commuter (in hours) has increased from 16 hours
in 1982 to 38.0 hours in 2011 (Shrank, Eisele, & Lomax, 2012). In recent years, there has been a
significant and wide-spread interest in the use of tolls and other forms of road pricing as a source
of funding, a means of managing congestion, and a way of providing additional traveler options.
Tolls have become increasingly attractive to state and local governments in the current fiscal
environment in which they face significant demands for services, but possess limited (even
decreasing) resources to meet these demands. Many states in the U.S. are experiencing shortfalls
in transportation funding, along with growing needs for surface transportation system
improvements to manage congestion. “Tolling and road pricing have become part of
contemporary transportation planning and policy making vernacular out of the need to address
traffic congestion and infrastructure funding short-falls” (Zmud & Arce, 2008, p. 49).
Despite the potential advantages of tolling, much of the existing empirical research in
transportation indicates that public acceptance of tolls has been low. Yet there are reasons to
believe that latent support for tolls may exist among the general public, as tolling can confer
benefits desired by many voters, including the many who rarely drive or infrequently use the
tolled facility. Among the potential benefits, revenue for needed infrastructure and public
transportation projects, less congestion for drivers, less pollution and reduced auto dependence
for environmentalists and smart growth advocates, just to mention a few. Thus, the benefits are
many and only those who pay the toll will bear the cost. The latter, of course, gain the benefit of
reduced congestion and faster travel.
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This research examines the willingness of residents in a community ( Hampton Roads,
Virginia) to pay a $3.00 toll to access a tunnel express lane that would be free of traffic delays
the majority of the time. We answer the research question “what factors influence citizens’
expressed willingness-to-pay a toll” by empirically estimating a four-factor model of
willingness-to-pay. Our approach is similar to that of Hamilton (2012), who studied the factors
predicting support for congestion pricing in three European cities. He looked at the impact of
five factors on support: self-interest, fairness, political ideology, trust in government, and
previous experience with congestion pricing. Our model includes measures of three of these
factors. Our model also includes measures of community concern along with measures of the
direct benefit to the respondent (e.g., congestion relief and commute time), trust in government,
and political and environmental liberalism. We use data about citizen perceptions from the Life
in Hampton Roads Survey, which is a survey of 700 residents of the Hampton Roads region in
Southeastern Virginia
Our study uses a textbook static model of congestion pricing with homogeneous values of
time, thus assuming a single value of time and a single road link. We do not include a direct
measure of the value of time in our model, as we assume that drivers will use the tunnel at
different times for a variety of reasons and the value of time will in all likelihood vary with the
reasons for travel. Moreover, some supporters of a toll may not use it very often, if at all (Gaunt,
Rye, & Allen, 2007; Jaensirisak, Wardman, & May, 2005). We do however have a measure of
individual income; and, as research on the value of time suggests, residents with more income
are more likely to be willing to pay the toll. But many other factors can influence support for a
toll. It is well-documented that the value of time varies by trip purpose, day of week, and type of
traffic encountered, which is to say that the value of time is more than a function of income and
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chronological time saved (Hamilton, 2012; Wardman & Nicolás Ibáñez, 2012). And, of course,
many low income residents of a city, such as those who rely on transit, may support a toll
because they are not likely to pay the toll or pay it infrequently and the toll, itself, can serve as an
alternative to a possible tax increase for infrastructure that they would have to pay. Others with a
low value of time may support the toll for political or environmental reasons (Eliasson &
Jonsson, 2011; Jaensirisak, et al., 2005). Thus, this study is designed to capture the factors
beyond income and time saved that lead to support for a toll. A city seeking to impose a toll can
design its campaign for support so that it clearly informs each subgroup of residents of their
specific benefits. Given the increasing reliance on user fees and user charges by governments in
the U.S., this study has implications for the research on citizen acceptance of (and willingness to
pay) similar fees or charges.
After providing some background information on the issue of tolling, we discuss the
importance of public support. We then present our four-factor model of support for tolling
followed by our study methods and results. The conclusion offers implications for future efforts
to gain public support for tolls, road pricing and similar user fees.

1.1 Some background on tolling and road pricing
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration,
as of January 1, 2011, toll facilities in the U.S. totaled 5,365 miles (Federal Highway
Administration, 2011). These toll facilities, which range from congested urban facilities to toll
roads linking rural areas, include not only highways, but also tunnels, bridges, and ferries. The
tolling structures vary widely, from multi-tiered price structures with discounts according to
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frequency of use, carpooling, and time of day discounts, to flat rate structures in which the only
differentiation is made on the basis of the number of axles per vehicle.
Tolls are a direct user fee charged for use of road capacity and services to the motorist.
Toll financing has a long tradition in the U.S. as a supplemental source of revenue to meet
transportation needs. In the late nineteenth century, toll road development tapered off as toll
evasion as well as rail travel increased. However, by the 1930s, some states began developing
public toll road programs to respond to growth in automobile ownership, the rising needs of
commerce, and the absence of significant Federal-aid for highways. While private tollway
companies dominated the "turnpike" industry in the earlier centuries, the toll facilities of the
twentieth century have largely been authorized, constructed, and managed by quasi-public
authorities established by state and local governments. The pursuit of toll roads declined after
1956, when the Federal Highway Act established a Federal gasoline tax to support the interstate
highway system and prohibited tolling on new, federally-funded highways.
In recent decades, increased transportation needs and public funding constraints have
fueled new interest in tolls as a revenue source to support transportation investment. The interest
in toll roads today is an outgrowth of federal legislation giving states greater flexibility to
implement tolling and road pricing. But it also reflects the multiple benefits derived from tolling,
of which three are prominent: (a) creation of adequate funds for urgently needed projects; (b) a
shift in the burden of capital, operating, and maintenance costs to specific users; and (c) the
generation of an immediate and direct source of revenue to discharge bond and other financing
obligations (Rusch, 1984). There is also an environmental argument for road pricing in that it
may reduce driving and its related externalities. While not commonly acknowledged as a key
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driver for imposing tolls, these environmental benefits have sometimes been included as part of
the case for a toll project.
The three prominent financial goals of tolling do not always coincide with the goals of
reducing congestion. However, as Santos and Fraser (2006, p. 266) note, it is common “to
confuse schemes that were designed to finance infrastructure with schemes designed to reduce
congestion.” The economic case for road pricing argues that absent pricing at the point of use,
the demand for road use will exceed its capacity, resulting in congestion (Vickrey, 1969). This is
true for most tolling cases where road pricing and imposition of tolls do not automatically lead to
expanded capacity. As such, tolling that was originally seen as a method for reducing congestion,
may also be seen as a source of funds for infrastructure. Similarly, tolling schemes intended to
finance transportation projects may also, with appropriate structuring of toll rates, become traffic
demand management tools. Thus, in today’s transportation environment, traffic congestion and
growing resource constraints are driving states towards considering toll pricing as not only a tool
to manage demand but also to ensure a sufficient revenue stream. This shift in purpose has made
tolls not just a simple financial calculation but a potentially powerful instrument of public
policy— of interest to constituencies with divergent interests. But, this shift in emphasis means
the toll must be priced high enough to discourage many drivers from using the tolled facility,
leading to the conundrum that as the toll goes up political support for it goes down. It is
necessary, therefore, to identify and reach out to potential supporters of a toll (in addition to
those whose value of time is high enough to pay the toll) if sufficient public support is to be
found for instituting the toll.
In this study, we focus on the public’s willingness-to-pay tolls for the direct benefit of
using an express lane that is free of traffic delays the majority of the time. While this implies an
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explicit purpose of using tolls for congestion management, as the previous discussion suggests, it
is often difficult for the public (and policymakers) to separate the congestion purpose from the
financial purpose of the toll. As such, our study does not confine itself solely to the congestion
benefits of the toll.

1.2 The importance of public support for tolls
Against a backdrop of growing transportation needs and declining resources, the net
result of changing policies and technological developments has been the need for increasing
public and political acceptance of toll financing for roads, bridges and tunnels. However,
popular discourse suggests that the public is opposed to tolling and road pricing. Similarly,
research using public opinion data has generally found low levels of support for a variety of
tolling mechanisms (Schade & Schlag, 2003). This public opposition poses challenges to
advocates of tolls and road pricing, despite the increasing awareness of the need for toll revenues
and the need to address congestion and traffic delays. While the technical aspects of the tolling
scheme (for example the toll rate, use of toll revenues, boundary limits, etc.) are important,
political will is also crucial. As Sumalee (2001) found from interviews with local officials in the
UK considering the implementation of congestion pricing, policymakers often emphasize public
acceptance as a decision criteria. Similarly, in discussing the possible extension of the London
Congestion Charging Scheme, Santos and Fraser (2006) note that political factors, and more
specifically constituent views, should be an important element in any policy decision of that
magnitude.
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Given that the public, through voting and other forms of political behavior, can (and
should) influence decisions to toll, it is important to understand the factors that shape public
support for tolling. Specifically, what makes the public more or less willing to pay tolls?
Most of the empirical work explaining public support for tolling has modeled stated
preferences (rather than revealed preferences), relying on expressed acceptance of (or support
for) tolling. We adopt a similar stated preferences approach, but focus instead on expressed
willingness-to-pay a toll, which is one step beyond simply accepting or supporting a toll.
Controlling for income as a constraint on willingness to pay, this study proffers a model of
willingness-to-pay tolls that includes concern for the community as well as political and
environmental beliefs. Thus, it relates support for tolling to existing community values and
concerns in the broader social setting.

2. A model for explaining willingness-to-pay tolls
As stated above, this study seeks to identify the factors that influence individuals’
willingness-to-pay a substantial $3 flat rate toll to bypass delays at tunnels by using an express
lane that would be free of delays the majority of the time. We develop and test a model that
builds on previous work on road pricing and environmental taxes (Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011;
Rienstra, Rietveld, & Verhoef, 1999; Schade & Baum, 2007; Schade & Schlag, 2003).
Using traditional political economy as a starting point, individuals should be willing to
pay a toll if the toll (and the subsequent benefits) maximizes their expected utility. However, we
argue that this utility is not solely a function of direct congestion relief in time saved to the
respondent, but instead also arises from (a) the relative cost of the tolls based on income and
frequency of use, (b) concern for the community including its economic health, and (c) liberal
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beliefs including trust in government and a concern for the environment. We propose a fourfactor model for explaining willingness-to-pay tolls (summarized in Figure 1). The first two
factors reflect the individual’s perception of the personal consequences of the tax. These factors
are motivated by the individual’s self-interest and are closely associated with (a) the direct
benefits the individual may receive from the toll, and (b) the relative costs imposed by the toll
that the individual must bear. The third factor is the individual’s concern for the broader
community and for the greater good. The final factor of the model reflects the individual’s
political and environmental leanings, including trust in government.
[Figure 1 Here]
The four factors and their respective variables are discussed next and summarized in
Table 1. Using this model, we explain willingness-to-pay tolls as a function of these variables:
congestion, tunnel delay, commute time, use of transit, future residential tenure, perception of
economic condition, road/congestion problems, income, frequency of tunnel travel, political
liberalism, environmental liberalism, trust in government and demographic factors.
[Table 1 Here]

2.1 Direct benefits to the respondent
Research shows that support for, and subsequent willingness-to-pay, tolls is related to
personal benefits perceived by users and non-users (Schade & Schlag, 2003; Zmud & Arce,
2008). Specifically, when a concrete benefit is linked to the idea of tolling or charging for road
usage, for example the reduction of congestion, support for tolling is higher (Hårsman &
Quigley, 2010; Zmud & Arce, 2008). Zettel and Carll (1964) propose that implementation of
road pricing would affect individuals according to three categories: (a) Tolled – those who pay
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the price because their high values of time and reliability make them better off paying; (b)
Tolled-off – Those who divert to parallel arterials or transit, since their gains from the toll are not
worth the high cost; (c) Untolled – those already on the parallel arterials. Those individuals in
the Tolled group would experience direct benefits from the tolled facility and would be expected
to be willing to pay the toll. The second and third groups, however, may perceive themselves as
losers from road pricing and therefore exhibit less willingness to pay the toll. But, many in the
second and third groups could support the toll either because they do not (or rarely) pay or
because they believe it confers other benefits they value, such as pollution reduction or needed
revenue for the local government.
Those who have experienced delay and congestion are more likely to be in the Tolled
category, and may be more willing to pay a toll in exchange for an improved driving experience.
But, their expectations of benefit may depend on their travel behavior, travel experiences, and
travel characteristics. We expect, therefore, to find that experience with congestion and delays
will lead to higher support for tolling (Jones, 1998; Schade & Baum, 2007; Steg, 2003). In
addition, as most individuals value their commuting time, an anticipated decrease in commute
time will increase the willingness-to-pay tolls (Hårsman & Quigley, 2010; Podgorski &
Kockelman, 2006). One other factor might also influence support for tolling. Transit users may
evince greater support for tolling, as they are less likely to routinely pay the toll, yet benefit from
the reduction in congestion on the occasions when they do use the toll facility (e.g., to be on time
for a doctor’s appointment). Odeck and Bråthen (1997) found that those who commute using
transit are less negative about tolling than those who commute via automobile.

2.2 Relative cost
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The same research on the personal benefits of tolls also suggests that willingness-to-pay
is related to the costs borne by the individual. However, rather than absolute cost, we focus on
the relative cost of the toll. The relative cost associated with a toll may decline for the individual
as his or her income rises. Thus, as the value of time studies show, the willingness-to-pay may be
a function of personal income with the more affluent indicating greater willingness-to-pay.
Research on the relationship between income and willingness-to-pay tolls is largely conflicting,
with some research finding a positive connection between income and willingness to pay while
others find no connection (see for example Odeck & Bråthen, 1997; Rienstra, et al., 1999;
Schade & Schlag, 2003; Verhoef, Nijkamp, & Rietveld, 1997). The absence of a clear
relationship may be due to the fact that frequent users, no matter their income, pay more over
time. In fact, opposition to tolling and congestion pricing may be a function of its impact on
disposable income as well as of its effect on total income. We include a measure of frequency of
use of the tunnel to test the possibility that frequent use, along with income, will influence the
willingness to pay; higher income is expected to increase willingnes-to-pay, while greater
frequency of use is expected to depress willingness-to-pay.

2.3 Community concern
In their study of willingness-to-pay for government services, Simonsen and Robbins
(1999) found evidence of a “halo” effect, where those who consumed more services had higher
willingness-to-pay for collectively consumed services, expressing greater preferences to pay for
the greater good. The same can be argued for tolling and road pricing, as support may be driven
by concerns greater than those directly related to self, such as concerns for the community,
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broader policy concerns about problems facing the local area, and concerns regarding the
economy in general.
Research finds that support for tolls increases with public awareness of problems with
congestion. Those who view congestion as a problem for their community are more likely to
endorse measures to alleviate it (Jaensirisak, et al., 2005; Verhoef, et al., 1997) . Concern for the
community is also evident in several studies that find many people who do not use public transit
will support a tax to fund it, when they see it as serving the needs of the poor and elderly
(Brodsky & Thompson, 1993; Dill & Weinstein, 2007). It is possible that the longer the
individual plans to stay in the community (future residential tenure), the greater the concern for
the good of the community. This could result in increased willingness-to-pay, as would the
belief that traffic and congestion is a serious problem in the community. Tolls and road pricing
may also be more acceptable for those individuals who already perceive transportation-related
problems, particularly traffic congestion, as major problems facing their community.
In addition, because road pricing and tolls impose economic costs on communities, the
willingness-to-pay tolls may be influenced by the individual’s perception of the broader
economic condition. The more positive the perception of the economic outlook, the less likely
the individual will be to believe the toll will have a negative impact on the community’s
economic wellbeing and, therefore, the greater the likelihood of support for the toll.

2.4 Political and environmental liberalism
Political ideology may also influence the individual’s willingness-to-pay (Hårsman &
Quigley, 2010). In the U.S., opposition to tolling apparently stems from right-wing populism and
conservative concerns over high levels of taxation, infringement on individual liberty, and
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government coercion. Therefore, political ideologies that lean toward Republican positions or
Conservatism may contribute to greater opposition to tolling and less willingness-to-pay such
tolls. Conversely, those with more liberal beliefs tend to be less opposed to government activism,
taxes, and policies designed to induce more sustainable behavior (Inglehart, 1997). Those with
more liberal beliefs about the environment tend to identify with the Democrat Party. We expect,
therefore, that individuals whose political leanings tend toward the Democrat Party and a Liberal
ideology to express greater willingness-to-pay tolls.
In reducing traffic and delays (and possibly even discouraging some driving) tolls may,
as a byproduct, reduce automobile emissions causing some to view tolls as environmentally
beneficial. While congestion pricing and tolling neither have an explicit environmental goal nor
are intended to address environmental externalities, they have been associated with some
environmental benefits. Jaensirisak et al. (2005) found that the single most important
contributor to increased support for tolling (and road pricing more broadly) was its presumed
environmental benefits.
Lack of support for tolls could be due to general lack of trust in government, possibly
associated with the public having no clear idea of how government resources are spent or the
belief that government funds are being spent wastefully. In Europe, Hamilton (2012) found that
low trust was associated with opposition to congestion pricing. O’Connell and Yusuf (2011) also
acknowledge the importance of trust when it comes to the issue of transportation taxes and user
charges. They proposed a model for presenting proposals to increase taxes and charges that
includes overt measures to increase trust, such as dedicating the revenue to a specific project.
Therefore, it is possible that those who express greater trust in government will be more
supportive of a toll. Schmöcker et al. (2011) note that the individual’s attitude toward the
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government, and trust specifically, also influences acceptance of an environmental tax (which
road pricing is sometimes considered), and find that trust in government has both direct and
indirect effects on acceptance. The general assertion is that individuals who trust their
government are more likely to support its policies (Hardin, 1999).
In sum, we include three indicators of political and environmental liberalism in our
model: trust in government, environmental liberalism, and political liberalism. We expect all to
be positive predictors of willingness-to-pay tolls.

2.5 Demographic controls
In addition to the four factors, we include demographic controls in our analysis. While
the “current evidence about the socioeconomic differences in the reaction towards urban road
pricing is inconclusive” (Gehlert, Kramer, Nielsen, & Schlag, 2011), some consistent findings
have been found in the literature. For example, research has found that women are more likely
than men to support road pricing (Golob, 2001; Hårsman & Quigley, 2010; Podgorski &
Kockelman, 2006). However, Podgorski and Kockelman (2006) found that older individuals are
more likely to support tolls, while Odeck and Bråthren (1997) found younger individuals to be
more supportive of tolling. We also include race as a control variable, as previous research
suggests that African Americans (and other minority groups) are less likely than whites to drive
(Massey & Denton, 1993) and those who drive less often may be more supportive of tolling.

3. Methodology
This study relies on data from the Life in Hampton Roads Survey designed and
administered by the Old Dominion University Social Science Research Center (Old Dominion
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University Social Science Research Center, 2011). The survey was designed to gather a
comprehensive description of community concerns. It consisted of 76 questions about media and
news consumption; arts, culture, and travel; quality of life; transportation; local and state
government and political issues; environmental issues; health and education; housing; spirituality
and well-being; neighborhood issues and crime; military life; and basic demographic
information. The survey was conducted using a computer assisted telephone interviewing
system. A random digit dial telephone sample comprised of telephone numbers with Hampton
Roads exchanges was used. A cellphone sample was also utilized based on switch points within
the Hampton Roads area. Calls were conducted from May through July 2011. A total of 730
completed interviews were obtained. After accounting for missing data, the sample for analysis
was reduced to 693.1 Responses represented all seven cities in the region referred to as Hampton
Roads, Virginia (Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Chesapeake, Suffolk, Portsmouth, Newport News and
Hampton).
The survey asked this question: “To bypass delays at tunnels in Hampton Roads would
you be willing to pay a toll of $3 to use an express lane, which would be free of delays the
majority of the time.” (A $3 toll had been under consideration as a remedy for congestion at the
tunnels.) The response categories were: Yes, No, or Maybe. The dependent variable—
willingness to pay tolls—is derived from this question. The yes and maybe responses were
collapsed into one category—those expressing some willingness to pay the toll. Given the
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logit regression is used to analyze the predictors
of willingness to pay.
The logit regression models willingness-to-pay (WTP) as:
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WTP = f(direct benefits, relative cost, community concern, political/environmental liberalism,
demographics)
= f(congestion, tunnel delay, commute time, use transit, income, tunnel travel, future
residential tenure, economic condition, congestion problems, political liberalism
trust in government, environmental liberalism, male, white, age, employed)

4. Results
Table 2 summarizes the results of the logit regression, presenting the logit coefficients
(unstandardized and standardized), odds ratios, and respective p-values. Some, but not all, of the
independent variables in each factor category are significant. Overall, the model is relatively
strong with good predictive ability. The McFadden’s adjusted pseudo-R2 is 0.728 and the model
correctly classified the outcome 95.53 percent of the time, correctly predicting the ‘yes/maybe’
outcome 90.85% of the time and the ‘no’ outcome 96.98% of the time.
There are four indicators of direct benefits in the model, two of which are significant
predictors of willingness to pay the toll: personal experience with congestion (p < .0001) and use
of transit (p < .01). Experience of tunnel delay was a positive predictor, which approached
significance (p = .105). Commute time was a negative predictor and insignificant.
Two of the three indicators of community concern reached statistical significance, but
one unexpectedly was a negative predictor. The positive predictor was an optimistic opinion
about economic conditions (p < .01). The negative predictor was the perception that traffic
congestion was the biggest problem facing the region. It is possible that this is reflects concerns
about the severity of the congestion problem and the negative relationship may arise out of the
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belief that tolls alone would not address the broader congestion problems in the region. Future
residential tenure was not significant.
Both variables representing the relative cost factor were significant predictors and in the
expected direction. Higher income respondents were more willing to pay the toll (p < .05) and
frequent users of the tunnel were less willing (p < .001).
In terms of the political and environmental liberalism factor, greater trust in government
was a significant positive predictor (p < .0001) of greater willingness to pay tolls while concern
for the environment decreases the likelihood of being willing to pay tolls (p < .05). This result is
surprising as tolls and congestion pricing are sometimes viewed as being environmentally-related
(such as reducing emissions from less idling and driving). However, environmental liberalism as
measured in this study reflects concerns over sea level rise and climate change, and may not be
as closely linked to issues such as air pollution that may be more directly related to attitudes and
beliefs about transportation. Furthermore, tolls are often not implemented with environmental
objectives in mind and rarely produce significant environmental benefits.
Finally, only one of the demographic variables was a significant predictor. White
respondents were more willing to pay the toll (p < .0001). The lack of significance of other
demographic variables such as age and gender mirror the generally inconclusive findings of
previous research.
[Table 2 Here]
Table 2 also presents the fully-standardized logit coefficients which take into account the
standard deviations of the independent and dependent variables. These standardized coefficients,
similar to standardized beta coefficients in linear regression, allow for comparison of the strength
of the respective independent variables on the willingness-to-pay tolls. In decreasing order of
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influence on willingness-to-pay tolls, the variables are: frequency of tunnel use, experience with
congestion, being white, perceptions of economic condition, trust in government, income,
concern for road/congestion, environmental liberalism, and use of transit.
Overall, the results of the logit regression indicate support for the traditional argument
that direct benefits and costs drive support for and willingness-to-pay tolls. The results also
support our argument that individuals’ willingness-to-pay tolls are motivated, in part, by
concerns for the greater community and by political and environmental beliefs. The findings
provide validation for our four-factor model of willingness-to-pay that extends beyond direct
benefits and costs to include other concerns and beliefs.

5. Discussion and Conclusion
This study proposed and tested an explanatory model of willingness-to-pay tolls that
includes four factors: (a) direct benefit; (b) relative cost; (c) community concern; and (d) political
and environmental liberalism. The results offer support for our four factor model. While not
every indicator was a significant predictor of willingness to pay, each of the four factors had a
significant indicator. Thus, like Hamilton’s (2012) research in Europe on support for congestion
pricing, the results suggest that support for tolls is more than a function of direct interest and the
time value of money, a measure related to income. Tolls are a type of user tax and attitudes
toward the role of government in the life of the community influence the willingness to pay taxes
as do variables relating to lifestyle and values. In addition to direct benefit and relative cost we
have identified two other factors at work: concern for the community and political and
environmental liberalism. The similarity of our results to Hamilton’s suggests that the four factor
model might apply in Europe as well as the United States.
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Only one of our indicators of liberalism was significant—trust in government. Hamilton
had two direct measures of liberal attitudes that were significant predictors of willingness to
support congestion pricing—belief that traffic damages the environment and belief that more
resources should be devoted to the environment. Future research could use these as indicators of
liberalism, especially environmental liberalism. It may be the case that the liberal respondents in
this study did not view the toll as an environmental reform. Moreover, some liberals may
interpret the toll as unfair to low income drivers.
The survey did not have a measure of the value of time. However, income appears to
have served as a useful substitute. The combination of income and frequency of tunnel use
appears to tease out the importance of the toll’s impact on disposable income, implying that
those who pay the fee on a regular basis are thinking of the toll’s impact on the family budget.
This is a finding consistent with the impact of family size on willingness to pay. Hamilton
(2012), for example found that people with children were less supportive of congestion pricing
even after he controlled for value of time and income. Our finding that transit users are more
supportive of tolling has been found in other studies.
In summation, this article makes three inter-related contributions to the study of tolling.
First, by connecting the multiple benefits of tolling to different types of supporters as well as
different reasons for support, it locates potential support for tolling in the broader community
including political liberals, those who pay it infrequently, as well as those who rely on transit. It
documents that many who are unlikely to pay the toll on a regular basis may support it for other
reasons. Thus support for tolling can be studied as more than a function of an individual’s
monetary value of time. Second, our four factor model has the implicit advantage of viewing
tolling as a tax as well as a user fee. Thus, many residents can be seen as potentially supporting a
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toll as a way to improve community life, as tolling can also generate support through the revenue
it raises, which can be legally dedicated to services the public favors. In both the U.S. and
Europe, the public is more likely to support a tax or toll when the revenue raised is dedicated
(sometimes referred to as hypothecating or earmarking) to a purpose the public deems
important.2 Third, it has implications for studying the political process of building support for
tolling, as there are a large number of residents who will not need to use the tolled facility on a
regular basis, who are potential supporters or value the toll for reasons beyond reductions in
travel time.
Another policy implication of our results concerns the opposition of frequent users of the
tunnel to paying a toll. They appear to view the toll as too costly, given their regular use of the
tunnel. Perhaps they would be more supportive if frequent users received a significant discount,
by for example, buying a monthly pass at a reduced rate, such as the rate reductions many central
city parking lots and authorities provide to commuters.
There are two key limitations of this study. First, the study used a single-price
assumption with all motorists charged the same rate per mile, resulting in an actual price or cost
that varies in proportion to time and place (Poole, 2011). Secondly, we did not specify the trip
purpose. However, as discussed, researchers have found that the value of time for motorists vary
greatly, depending on trip purpose and urgency, time of day and week, distinction between
business travel or leisure travel, and individual preferences (Small, Winston, & Yan, 2006). We
are unable to specifically capture these value variations in our study. Despite this drawback, our
study offers and establishes a framework or model for explaining willingness-to-pay tolls that
incorporates factors beyond personal benefits and costs. While this framework appears to work
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for the case of a single-price toll, future studies could apply and test this model using more
complicated toll structures.

END NOTES
1. The missing data were determined to be missing completely at random, and therefore are not
expected to influence the results and findings.
2. The impact of dedicating the revenue can be substantial. In a recent study on attitudes toward
increasing the federal gas tax in the United States, Agrawal et al. (2013) found that support
for the tax increase rose from 20 to 58 percent when it was earmarked for road maintenance,
to 54 percent when earmarked for improvements in road safety, and to 49 percent, when
spent to reduce local air pollution.
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Fig. 1. Four-Factor Model for Explaining Willingness-to-pay Tolls

Relative Costs
•Income (+)
•Frequency of tunnel
travel (-)

Community Concerns
•Future residential tenure
(+)
•Economic condition (+)
•Congestion problem (+)

Direct Benefits
•Congestion (+)
•Tunnel delay (+)
•Commute time (+)
•Use transit (+)
Willingness-to-pay
Tolls

Political &
Environmental
Liberalism
•Political liberalism (+)
•Environmental liberalism
(+)
•Trust in government (+)
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Table 1 Factors and Variables (N=693)
Variables

Definition

Mean

SD

Willingness-to-

Willing to pay toll of $3 to use an express lane that would be free of

0.237

0.425

pay toll

delays. 0 (No), 1 (Yes/maybe)

Congestion

Index based on agreement (0-No, 1-Yes) with:

1.931

1.104

a)

Traffic congestion in Hampton Roads during the morning peak (69am) is a major problem for me.

b)

Traffic congestion in Hampton Roads during the evening peak (36pm) is a major problem for me.

c)

Within the past month, did you avoid visiting a business in a
neighboring city due to concerns about traffic congestion?

Ranges from 0 (congestion is not a problem) to 3 (congestion is a major
problem)
Tunnel delay

Have experienced some delays at tunnels. 0 (No), 1 (Yes)

0.903

0.296

Commute time

How long is your average one-way commute, in minutes, to work or

22.831

13.294

0.004

0.066

0.469

0.499

0.719

0.730

0.206

0.405

5.413

3.154

3.126

1.407

1.560

0.837

school?
Use transit

In the past week, have you used public transportation (including buses or
taxis) in Hampton Roads? 0 (No), 1 (Yes)

Future residential

Do you plan to still live in the region five years from now? 0 (No), 1

tenure

(Yes)

Economic

Perceptions of the region’s economic conditions and the country’s

condition

economic conditions. Ranges from 0 (low) to 3 (high)

Road/congestion

Traffic congestion or roads/bridges maintenance are the biggest problem

problems

facing the region today. 0 (No), 1 (Yes)

Income

Family household income. Values: 1 (less than $10,000), 2 (more than
$10,000 to $20,000), 3 (more than $20,000 to $30,000), 4 (more than
$30,000 to $40,000), 5 (more than $40,000 to $50,000), 6 (more than
$50,000 to $60,000), 7 (more than $60,000 to $70,000), 8 (more than
$70,000 to $80,000), 9 (more than $80,000 to $90,000), 10 (more than
$90,000 to $100,000), 11 (more than $100,000)

Frequency of

How often have you traveled through a tunnel in Hampton Roads during

tunnel travel

the last month? 2 (once or twice), 3 (3-4 times), 4 (5-6 times), 5 (more
than once a week)

Political

Index based on:

liberalism

a)

Democrat political party affiliation (0-No, 1-Yes)

b)

Liberal political ideology (0-No, 1-Yes)

c)

Support for the Tea Party movement (0-Yes, 1-No)

Ranges from 0 (low) to 3 (high)
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Environmental

Index based on agreement with the following:

1.719

0.505

liberalism

a)

Global warming is an environmental problem

b)

Rising sea levels in the rest of the world is a concern

0.297

0.580

Male

0.214

0.410

White

0.266

0.442

Age

49.935

11.740

Employed

0.430

0.495

Ranges from 0 (no environmental concerns) to 2 (serious environmental
concerns)
Trust in

Index based on agreement (0-No, 1-Yes) with:

government

a)

Most of the time the local government can be trusted to do what is
right

b)

Local government uses public resources wisely

c)

State government uses public resources wisely

Ranges from 0 (low) to 3 (high)
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Table 2 Logistic Regression of Willingness-to-pay Tolls
Logit Coeff.

Odds Ratio
Coeff.

Standardized
Logit Coef.

p-value

Expected
Sign

1.541
(0.333)
1.327
(0.819)
-0.030
(0.023)
5.004
(1.856)

4.671

0.446

<0.0001

+

3.769

0.103

0.105

+

0.971

-0.104

0.202

+

149.003

0.086

0.007

+

-0.829
(0.905)
1.649
(0.590)
-1.249
(0.589)

0.436

-0.109

0.359

+

5.201

0.316

0.005

+

0.287

-0.133

0.034

+

0.303
(0.137)
Frequency of tunnel travel
-1.240
(0.386)
Political & Environmental Liberalism
Political liberalism
-0.248
(0.313)
Environmental liberalism
-0.986
(0.427)
Trust in government
1.663
(0.318(
Demographics
Male
-0.189
(0.746)
White
2.879
(0.697)
Age
-.0034
(0.019)
Employed
-0.905
(0.692)
Constant
-1.651
(1.934)
N
693
584.35
Χ2
Pseudo-R2
0.771
McFadden's Adjusted R2
0.728

1.354

0.251

0.027

+

0.289

-0.458

0.001

-

0.781

-0.054

0.429

+

0.373

-0.131

0.021

+

5.276

0.253

<0.0001

+

0.828

-0.020

0.800

17.788

0.334

<0.0001

0.967

-0.104

0.072

0.404

-0.118

0.191

Direct Benefits
Congestion
Tunnel delay
Commute time
Use transit
Community Concerns
Future residential tenure
Economic condition
Road/congestion problems
Relative Costs
Income

0.393

<0.0001

